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PROTECTION FOR FAMILIES: NEW STANDARDS 
DEVELOPING IN ASYLUM LAW 
Jillian Blake* 
INTRODUCTION 
As a basic principle of asylum law, individuals should be protected 
from persecution based on personal traits that they cannot change.1 Family 
ties make up some of the most fundamental and permanent connections in 
life. Therefore, persecution based on one’s family has long been considered 
a ground for asylum in the United States.2 Still, the scope and meaning of 
that protection has come under dispute recently and, as a result, may be 
expanding. 
In the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, a 
“refugee” is defined as a person who is outside of his or her country of 
nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of that 
country’s protection, and has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
 
*  J.D., University of Michigan Law School (2011); M.A., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) (2006); B.A., Johns Hopkins University (2005). The author practices 
immigration and asylum law at Blake & Wilson Immigration Law, PLLC in Alexandria, Virginia. 
1 See, e.g., Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] [protected] social group is 
defined abstractly as a group united by 1) a voluntary association which imparts some common 
characteristic that is fundamental to the members’ identities, or 2) an innate characteristic which is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members they either cannot or should not be required 
to change it.”) [https://perma.cc/X4B7-YCMY]; Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (recognizing sexual orientation and sexual identity as “immutable” and “fundamental to 
one’s identity” and therefore able to constitute a social group for purposes of asylum protection) 
[https://perma.cc/YE2Q-H8WU]; Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that “parents 
of Burmese student dissidents do share a ‘common, immutable characteristic’ sufficient to comprise a 
particular social group” for purposes of asylum) [https://perma.cc/R5YY-K8DS]. The legal standards 
discussed in this Essay generally apply to withholding of removal as well as asylum; however, the 
burden of proof is higher for withholding of removal than for asylum. Compare INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (citation omitted) (holding that an asylum applicant must establish 
that “persecution is a reasonable possibility”) [https://perma.cc/GM78-EJYX], with INS v. Stevic, 
467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984) (holding that an applicant for withholding of removal must establish that 
“[persecution] is more likely than not”) [https://perma.cc/XWG9-PUQ2]. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) 
(2016) (discussing burden of proof for withholding of removal) [https://perma.cc/ND6K-EHEE]. 
2 See, e.g., Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 865, 872 (7th Cir. 2009) (remanding with directions to 
consider persecution based on parents’ political activities in Ethiopia) [https://perma.cc/BV3T-PYWR]; 
Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the BIA erred by not considering 
familial ties to actors who may have participated in a political assassination) [https://perma.cc/C5WL-
6KSR]; Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing applicant had a potential 
claim for asylum based on applicant’s family members’ persecution for violation of the one-child policy 
in China) [https://perma.cc/89GR-QC6J]; Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Perhaps a prototypical example of a ‘particular social group’ would consist of the immediate 
members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and 
common interests for most people.”) [https://perma.cc/4LGH-CBBZ]; In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 
346 (B.I.A. 1996) (remanding denial of asylum because of applicant’s membership in a persecuted 
Somalian clan) [https://perma.cc/ZCL5-FA9L]. 
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reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”3 Family-based persecution has been recognized 
under the “particular social group” ground of the Refugee Convention.4 
Over the past several years, however, a circuit split has emerged between 
U.S. courts of appeals over whether, in mixed-motive cases, persecution 
based on one’s family ties can form the basis of an asylum claim. For 
example, if a mother is threatened after her son refuses to join a gang, has 
she been persecuted for being her son’s mother, or is she the victim of a 
threat aimed at coercing her son to join the gang with no asylum 
implications? If a man is shot the day after his brother testifies in a murder 
trial, has he been persecuted on account of his family connection, or was 
the act only retaliation for his brother’s testimony? 
The current legal answer depends on which court you ask. Some 
courts of appeals have accepted the more expansive interpretation—
persecution caused by family relationships can be sufficient to form the 
basis for a claim of asylum even in cases with multiple motives.5 Other 
courts of appeals, however, have taken a narrower approach and have asked 
whether “hatred for a family” was the persecutor’s sole motive or whether 
the family connection was related to another goal.6 The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has not yet issued a published decision on the 
question,7 and the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.8 
This Essay analyzes the heart of the legal dispute—the nexus 
requirement, or what it means to have a well-founded fear of persecution 
“on account of” or “for reasons of” a protected characteristic. The Essay 
argues that courts and the BIA should adopt a “family focus” approach to 
asylum claims involving persecution on the basis of family ties. The Essay 
looks at several existing nexus frameworks to develop the family focus 
approach including sole cause, but-for, circumstantial/contributing cause, 
and bifurcated nexus tests. The family focus approach combines the but-for 
 
3 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter Refugee Convention] [https://perma.cc/6K3P-NSA5]. 
4 See supra note 2. 
5 See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 129 (4th Cir. 2011) (remanding case of an 
asylum applicant who feared persecution based on family ties and threats of gang violence) 
[https://perma.cc/UJ4B-WUA4]. 
6 See, e.g., Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he evidence that gang 
members sought information from Ramirez-Mejia about her brother, without more, does not support her 
claim that the gang intended to persecute her on account of her family.”) [https://perma.cc/84TR-
4KV9]. 
7 The BIA almost always defers to circuit court precedent in those courts’ jurisdictions. In 
jurisdictions with no controlling circuit court precedent, the BIA applies its own decision or precedent. 
See In re Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31–32 (1989) (“[W]e have historically followed a court’s 
precedent in cases arising in that circuit.”) [https://perma.cc/57JX-96AF]; Laura S. Trice, Adjudication 
by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration 
Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1772 (2010) (“When confronted with a split in circuit 
precedent, the BIA defers to the federal courts of appeals and follows the law of a given circuit in cases 
arising within that circuit, even if the BIA disagrees with that particular court’s precedent.”) 
[https://perma.cc/WR42-93GS]. 
8 The U.S. Supreme Court previously denied certiorari on this issue in the case Demiraj v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 2454 (2012) [https://perma.cc/DB9A-TVVX]. 
111:49 (2016) Protection for Families 
51 
and circumstantial/contributing cause models and finds sufficient nexus 
where the asylum applicant’s family ties were either a but-for cause of a 
fear of persecution or increased the risk of persecution. Under this 
approach an asylum seeker would satisfy the nexus requirement if the 
asylum applicant would be free from fear of harm if not for a family 
connection or would be at greater risk of harm because of family ties. 
The Essay then argues that courts and the BIA should recognize 
family-based social groups without additional descriptors in mixed-motive 
cases.9 For example, persecution on account of being part of the social 
group “family members of those who resist MS-13 gang recruitment” 
should instead be formulated as “family members of [name of family 
member who resisted recruitment],” “members of the [family name] 
family,” or simply “family.”10 Because groups based on kinship ties alone 
meet asylum social group requirements, there is no reason to modify the 
group with non-asylum ground factors. Furthermore, excluding non-asylum 
ground factors in the protected group formulation simplifies and clarifies 
the nexus analysis. This Essay will demonstrate that the family focus 
approach is not only logically sound, but is also consistent with asylum 
protection offered to other individuals who face persecution for multiple 
reasons. 
Finally, the Essay discusses In re Alba, an important mixed-motive, 
family-based asylum case currently being considered by the BIA.11 In April 
2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) filed a brief in the case 
that could signal a wider acceptance of mixed-motive, family-based asylum 
claims in the future. 
I. FAMILIES AS PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS 
Family-based groups have long been recognized under the “particular 
social group” ground of the Refugee Convention, and kinship groups have 
been found to meet the BIA’s current particular social group requirements 
for asylum.12 In In re Acosta, the BIA defined persecution on account of 
particular social group as: 
[P]ersecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a 
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. 
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or 
 
9 Family groups are not explicitly listed in the Refugee Convention but are considered protected 
under the Convention ground of “particular social group.” See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 
1(A)(2). See infra Section I for a full explanation of family-based particular social groups. 
10 The BIA has not recognized groups that resist gang recruitment as particular social groups. See, 
e.g., In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) [https://perma.cc/732D-LSQY]; In re W-G-R-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014) [https://perma.cc/356D-JNLJ]; In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 
582–84 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting the particular social group “Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang 
recruitment, or family members of such Salvadoran youth”) [https://perma.cc/5ZHU-X3NY]; In re E-
A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting the particular social group “persons resistant to 
gang membership”) [https://perma.cc/VNC6-9FSS]. 
11 In re Alba, No. A200 533 090 (B.I.A. 2016) (briefs filed Mar. 21, 2016, decision pending); see 
also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief, In re Alba, No. A200 553 090 (B.I.A. 2016) 
[hereinafter DHS Brief] [https://perma.cc/9QKR-QAU5]. 
12 See supra note 2. 
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kinship ties . . . . [W]hatever the common characteristic that defines the 
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences.13 
In addition to the “immutability” requirement articulated in Acosta, 
the BIA has held that “particularity” and “social distinction” are also 
requirements for particular social groups.14 In one of the BIA’s most 
recently published particular social group decisions, In re M-E-V-G-, the 
social distinction requirement is described as: 
[W]hether those with a common immutable characteristic are set apart, or 
distinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way. In 
other words, if the common immutable characteristic were known, those with 
the characteristic in the society in question would be meaningfully 
distinguished from those who do not have it. A viable particular social group 
should be perceived within the given society as a sufficiently distinct 
group.15 
In the same decision, the BIA described the particularity requirement as the 
group being “discrete and hav[ing] definable boundaries—it must not be 
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”16 
The Ninth Circuit, in a 1986 decision, described family as a 
“prototypical example of a ‘particular social group.’”17 More recently, in 
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit found that the social 
group of family is “paradigmatically immutable” and, in reference to 
particularity, “possesses boundaries that are at least as ‘particular and well-
defined’ as other groups whose members have qualified for asylum.”18 The 
Fourth Circuit found that families are socially distinct, as “few groups [are] 
more readily identifiable than the family.”19 In fact, “every circuit to have 
considered the question has held that family ties can provide a basis for 
asylum.”20 The BIA also held in In re C-A- that “family relationship[s] are 
generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social 
groups.”21 
II. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT IN U.S. ASYLUM LAW 
In addition to establishing membership in a particular social group, the 
applicant must show that he or she fears persecution because of 
membership in that group. This aspect of the international definition of 
refugee was modified slightly when it was incorporated into U.S. law in the 
 
13 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) [https://perma.cc/UL6B-FPKJ], rev’d on other grounds, 
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) [https://perma.cc/VC32-GZ4A]. 
14 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239–40. 
15 Id. at 238. 
16 Id. at 239. 
17 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
18 Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124–25 (4th Cir. 2011). 
19 Id. at 126. 
20 Id. at 125. 
21 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) [https://perma.cc/JH7U-TAX4]. 
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1980 Refugee Act, which defined refugee as a person with a “well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of” (rather than “for reasons of”) “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”22 
The “for reason of” or “on account of” causation clause in the 
definition of refugee is commonly referred to as the “nexus requirement.”23 
The Refugee Convention gave “no guidance as to how to interpret or 
implement the nexus requirement” and there are currently no “prescribed 
standards or tests for determining causation in asylum cases.”24 
In the 1992 case INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the nexus requirement, finding that an applicant must fear 
persecution “because of” a protected ground and that direct proof of the 
persecutor’s motives was not required, but that “[the applicant] must 
provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.”25 Although there is 
no definitive nexus standard in U.S. asylum law, courts and the BIA have 
accepted mixed-motive asylum claims.26 
In 2005, the U.S. Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which required 
that an enumerated Convention ground be “at least one central reason” for 
the persecution suffered by the applicant.27 Notably, the REAL ID Act 
“does not set forth any standards or tests for determining causation.”28 In 
2007, the BIA explained the REAL ID Act’s “one central reason” standard 
further in In re J-B-N- & S-M-.29 The Board held that under the standard, 
“the protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past 
mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment. That is, it cannot be 
incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for 
harm.”30 
In the seminal asylum case In re Mogharrabi, the BIA found that an 
applicant must show that:  
 
22 Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014) [https://perma.cc/VKR3-
FUDV]. 
23 Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 386 (2014) [hereinafter New Nexus] 
[https://perma.cc/4UQG-R5E7]. 
24 Id. at 387; see also Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465, 469–75 (2015) (discussing the 
history of the nexus requirement) [https://perma.cc/P245-H55N]. 
25 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) [https://perma.cc/SZ7X-9EAP]. 
26 See, e.g., Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that a Colombian businessman was persecuted both for extortion and for his political affiliations) 
[https://perma.cc/EKZ7-3H32]; Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that an asylum 
applicant was extorted by Philippine communist guerillas “at least in part” because of her political 
opinion) [https://perma.cc/Z73W-YYYL]; In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 495–97 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(discussing mixed motives for threats, including the applicant’s anti-government political views) 
[https://perma.cc/4NJA-CB2Y]. 
27 REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009) [https://perma.cc/NNB6-RBKG]. The 
BIA has also extended the “one central reason” standard to include withholding of removal cases. See 
In re C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010) [https://perma.cc/QB33-ASWF]. 
28 New Nexus, supra note 23, at 389. 
29 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2007) [https://perma.cc/3US8-7L4C]. In In re C-T-L-, the 
Board held that the “one central reason” standard applies to asylum and withholding of removal. 25 I. & 
N. Dec. at 348. 
30 In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 214. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
54 
(1) [he or she] possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to 
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor 
is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this 
belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the 
alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien.31 
Later, however, in In re Kasinga, another foundational asylum case 
involving a woman who feared female genital mutilation, the BIA held that 
even though “many of [their] past cases involved actors who had a 
subjective intent to punish their victims . . . . [T]his subjective ‘punitive’ or 
‘malignant’ intent is not required for harm to constitute persecution.”32 In 
female genital mutilation cases, “[i]t was often midwives or elders who 
carried out the [genital mutilation] itself, which they believed was a 
positive act for the young woman” and had no hatred towards or intent to 
punish the woman for her status or group.33 The nexus requirement has 
caused significant disagreement among circuit courts in family-based 
asylum claims. 
III. FAMILY-BASED ASYLUM AND THE NEXUS CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Courts have definitively established that family meets the criteria of a 
particular social group, so the primary challenge for asylum seekers in 
family-based asylum claims is establishing nexus (or causation). 
Complications arise when the persecutor has additional motives beyond the 
family relationship—for example, coercion, extortion, or revenge. In these 
situations, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits require an inquiry into the 
original motives of the persecutor, while the First, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits have not considered the persecutor’s additional motives to be 
determinative. 
A. Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Additional Motives Determinative 
In Demiraj v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit held that the wife and son of a 
prospective witness in a U.S. trial against a suspected Albanian human 
smuggler would not be targeted “on account of” their family ties if returned 
to Albania.34 Because any acts against the wife and son would be 
“motivated solely by criminal intent, personal vendettas, or personal desires 
for revenge,” the court found that the wife and son could not satisfy the 
nexus requirement, as the family would not be persecuted “as such.”35 
However, the dissent argued that “there [was] no evidence that Bedini 
[had] any grudge against Mrs. Demiraj, her son, or any other Demiraj 
family members as individuals—rather, his only interest in them [was] 
 
31 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 
1985)). 
32 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) [https://perma.cc/5YD9-PGUU]. 
33 New Nexus, supra note 23, at 394 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (citing Karen 
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for 
Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 799 (2003) [https://perma.cc/HS9A-RB2N]). 
34 631 F.3d 194, 195–98 (5th Cir. 2011) [https://perma.cc/2PDZ-7JCQ]. 
35 Id. at 199. 
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because of their membership in the family of Mr. Demiraj.”36 
In Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit similarly rejected a 
family-based asylum claim from a Honduran woman who argued that “she 
was persecuted, at least in part, on the basis of her family membership.”37 
The applicant claimed she was persecuted on the basis of her family group 
after receiving threatening notes from a gang seeking information on her 
brother because “[w]ithout her relationship to her brother” the gang would 
not have targeted her, and the “request for information by the gang 
members was . . . inseparable from her relationship with her brother.”38 
However, the court disagreed: 
there is no reason to suppose that those who persecute to obtain information 
also do so out of hatred for a family, or vice versa. . . . This is particularly 
true in light of the fact that other members of her family, who have remained 
in Honduras, have not faced persecution on the basis of their membership in 
the family.39 
In Yin Guan Lin v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit held that “family 
members of known Chinese debtors who fear punishment from creditors 
for outstanding debt” did not meet the requirements of the nexus test.40 
While the court did find that “the family unit can constitute a social group,” 
it held that “Lin [did] not demonstrate[] that his family ties motivated the 
alleged persecution.”41 Instead, the harm that “Lin faced arose from a 
personal dispute between his father and his father’s creditors. Debtors who 
fear creditors do not qualify for social-group membership.”42 Essentially, 
the Seventh Circuit held that because his father’s social group was not 
cognizable, the applicant’s also could not be.43 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits require an inquiry into the origins of 
persecutor’s motives. Under this approach, it is not enough that familial ties 
motivated the feared persecution. Instead, the motive of the persecutor 
must be an animus towards the family itself, rather than retaliation against, 
or punishment of, a family member for a reason unrelated to family 
membership. The Seventh Circuit suggested in Lin that it would accept 
mixed-motive, family-based asylum claims, but only if the original family 
member were targeted for another protected reason, such as political 
opinion. 
 
36 Id. at 202 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
37 794 F.3d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2015) [https://perma.cc/6SD4-4B7W]. 
38 Id. at 492–93 (alteration in original). 
39 Id. at 493.  
40 411 F. App’x 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2011) [https://perma.cc/63AG-H4W2].  
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 906. 
43 Id.; see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 154 F. App’x 520, 522 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We have suggested that 
an immediate family qualifies as a social group, but typically such a situation involves the family in 
question being targeted for a reason that is also a protected ground.”) (citation omitted) 
[https://perma.cc/F8A8-DNUA]. 
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B. First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits: Additional Motives Not 
Determinative 
The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a different approach. 
In mixed-motive, family-based asylum cases these circuits have not 
required that the original or sole intent of the persecutor be animus towards 
the family as a group. 
In the 1993 case Gebremichael v. INS, the First Circuit considered a 
claim concerning Ethiopian security forces targeting a man to extract 
information about his brother, in a practice referred to as “cherchez la 
famille (‘look for the family’).”44 The First Circuit found that “no 
reasonable factfinder could fail to find that petitioner was singled out for 
mistreatment because of his relationship to his brother. Thus, this is a clear 
case of ‘[past] persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular 
social group.’”45 
In a more recent case, Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, the First Circuit heard 
a claim in which a criminal gang kidnapped a Guatemalan business owner 
and sought ransom from his two sons.46 Once the sons paid the ransom the 
gang murdered their father.47 Subsequently, the members of the gang began 
threatening the sons, causing them to flee the country and seek asylum 
based on the social group of family.48 
The immigration judge and the BIA denied relief in the case, holding 
that the applicants’ father was the victim of a crime motivated by the 
gang’s perception of his wealth and not on the basis of a protected 
characteristic.49 The BIA denied relief and “appear[ed] to have 
concluded . . . that a family cannot qualify as a particular social group 
unless a member of the family (or, perhaps, the family itself) can also claim 
another protected ground.”50 However, the First Circuit reversed the 
immigration judge and BIA and found that kinship ties alone form a basis 
for asylum.51 It found, for example, that there would be grounds for asylum 
if: 
a local militia . . . single[d] out a prominent wealthy family, kidnap[ped] 
family members for ransom, effectively dr[o]ve the family into poverty, and 
pursue[d] them throughout the country in order to show the local community 
that even its most prominent families are not immune and that the militia’s 
rule must be respected.52 
 
44 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (defining the practice as “terrorization of one family member to 
extract information about the location of another family member or to force the missing family member 
to come forward”) [https://perma.cc/EQ8T-H2L8]. 
45 Id. (alteration in original) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). 
46 757 F.3d 9, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2014) [https://perma.cc/4VRQ-ZF7U]. 
47 Id. at 13. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 13–14. 
50 Id. at 15. 
51 Id. (“The law in this circuit and others is clear that a family may be a particular social group 
simply by virtue of its kinship ties, without requiring anything more.”). 
52 Id. at 19. 
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Thus the First Circuit found that in mixed-motive cases, initial non-asylum 
ground motivations would not necessarily disqualify applicants from 
protection.53 The court reasoned that motives can change over time and 
that, just like other protected social groups, family can be one “central 
reason” for persecution.54 
In Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, the applicant was granted asylum by 
an immigration judge based on the social group “family members of those 
who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial 
witnesses.”55 Crespin-Valladares faced threats after his uncle testified in a 
murder trial against MS-13 gang members.56 On appeal, the BIA rejected 
Crespin-Valladares’s claim because “those who actively oppose gangs in El 
Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” did not form a 
particular social group.57 The Fourth Circuit found that the BIA committed 
legal error in making this determination because it did not consider the 
proper social group—Crespin-Valladares’s family.58 Furthermore, it found 
that the BIA erred in disregarding the immigration judge’s finding that 
Crespin-Valladares was targeted based on his relationship to his uncle.59 
The Fourth Circuit recently held in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch that an 
applicant’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was 
threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18, and the 
gang members’ demands leveraged her maternal authority to control her 
son’s activities.”60 The court found that although there were multiple 
reasons for the gang targeting Hernandez, it was unreasonable to assert that 
her status as her son’s mother “[was] not at least one central reason for her 
persecution.”61 
Finally, in 2015, the Ninth Circuit found in Rios v. Lynch that the 
asylum applicant feared persecution based on a “vendetta against his 
family” which stemmed from a family member agreeing to testify against a 
gang member in court, rather than belonging to the group “witnesses 
against gangs.”62 The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in not 
considering the applicant’s family as a social group and instead only 
focusing on the group “witnesses against gangs.”63 The court remanded the 
decision to the BIA to consider his family-based social group, describing 
 
53 Id. at 18 (“[A]sylum is still proper in mixed-motive cases even where one motive would not be 
the basis for asylum, so long as one of the statutory protected grounds is ‘at least one central reason’ for 
the persecution.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). 
54 Id.; see REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009). 
55 632 F.3d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 2011). 
56 Id. at 120. 
57 Id. at 125. 
58 Id. at 125–26. 
59 Id. at 127. 
60 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015) [https://perma.cc/3S4R-226Y]; see also Cordova v. Holder, 
759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the BIA failed to consider the family-based claim of an 
applicant who was targeted for his family members’ membership in a rival gang) 
[https://perma.cc/K978-TSMF]. 
61 Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950. 
62 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) [https://perma.cc/4C7X-YQJ6]. 
63 Id. at 1128. 
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the family as the “quintessential particular social group.”64 
The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits did not rely solely on the original 
intent of the persecutor to establish nexus and instead focused on whether 
there was a causal link between the family relationship and the harm 
feared. 
IV. DISPUTES IN THE FAMILY-BASED ASYLUM NEXUS CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit split on nexus in mixed-motive, family-based asylum cases 
stems from two main points of disagreement. First, the courts disagree over 
whether intent to punish the family as such is required to find nexus in 
family-based asylum cases. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that 
the family must be persecuted “as such,” meaning as a result of hatred 
towards, or punishment of, the family itself. While this description of nexus 
has generally been accepted in other areas of U.S. asylum law,65 it is not 
always necessary to establish nexus.66 Examples of persecution not solely 
based on account of hatred or punishment of the persecuted group include 
forced sterilization, female genital mutilation, and domestic violence.67 
Furthermore, as the First Circuit aptly points out, in many mixed-motive, 
family-based asylum cases the intent of the persecutor is to punish the 
family itself after being crossed by one of its members or after initially 
targeting the family for another reason.68 In fact, “‘generalized . . . 
vengeful’ hatred of entire families frequently originates from retaliation for 
an individual’s actions.”69 For example, “the legendary Hatfield-McCoy 
feud had its roots in the alleged murder of a McCoy by a Hatfield.”70 
If this same reasoning were extended to other groups, protection 
would be impermissibly limited. For example, if a persecutor originally had 
a confrontation with a person of a certain racial or religious group unrelated 
to that characteristic which then led that person to develop a hatred of that 
whole group, and target others in the group, those persons would not 
qualify for protection. Requiring that hatred of the family itself be the sole 
motivation for persecution contradicts the established acceptance of mixed-
motive cases and the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol.71 
Second, the Seventh Circuit suggested that, for mixed-motive, family-
based asylum claims to be successful, the persecutor’s motives other than 
the family connection must also be a ground for asylum.72 However, as 
long as the family connection forms at least one central reason for the 
feared persecution, there is no reason to evaluate the other motivations if 
 
64 Id. 
65 See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987). 
66 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
67 New Nexus, supra note 23, at 390–403. 
68 See Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2014). 
69 Brief for Amici Curiae Human Rights and Refugee Organizations Supporting Petitioners at 11, 
Demiraj v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 2454 (2012) (No. 10-1545) (citation omitted). 
70 Id. 
71 See supra Section II. 
72 See Yin Guan Lin v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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the applicant is not claiming protection for those reasons. Requiring an 
additional ground in family-based cases could force applicants to 
simultaneously argue the merits of an asylum claim for their family 
member. This would be problematic because the immigration judge only 
has jurisdiction over the applicant’s claim, and consequently the record 
before the immigration judge will only be sufficiently developed for the 
applicant’s claim, not his or her family members’. Furthermore, requiring 
mixed-motive, family-based asylum seekers to show that any of their 
persecutors’ alternative motivations were also Convention grounds gives 
family an inferior status as a social group because it cannot always stand on 
its own. It would be unfair to give preference to certain enumerated 
grounds of protection over others. 
The ultimate result in many family-based asylum claims may appear 
counterintuitive: the family members of a threatened witness or person who 
resists gang recruitment qualify for asylum while the original person 
threatened may not. This seemingly odd result is nonetheless valid. The 
unease with the result likely stems from an underlying belief that the 
original family member also deserves asylum, rather than that neither do. 
For example, witnesses and informants are recognized by some courts as 
forming a social group deserving of protection, while other courts do not 
recognize such groups.73 But when the original family member’s claim has 
no merit, the validity of family protection alone is clearer. For example, 
suppose the original family member is targeted because he or she 
committed a murder or terrorist act. For these actions, his or her innocent 
family members are targeted for revenge. In this case, it is not 
counterintuitive that the innocent family members could claim asylum, yet 
the original family member would not be able to. Unease with the result of 
many family-based asylum cases suggests that an expansion of protection 
is needed, rather than a contraction. 
V. ANALYZING FAMILY-BASED ASYLUM THROUGH NEXUS MODELS 
In the decisions described above, courts accepted opposing models of 
causation without explicitly acknowledging they were selecting a particular 
model or explaining why they chose the model they did.74 Going forward, 
judges and the BIA should clarify the model of causation they are 
accepting and why they are choosing that model. Analyzing the nexus 
requirement using the nexus models discussed below will help to expose 
the root of legal disagreements among the circuits and should eventually 
 
73 Compare Garcia v. Holder, 746 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2014) [https://perma.cc/79WZ-M7ZQ], 
Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2009) [https://perma.cc/WW48-DQD3], and In re C-A-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding informants do not qualify as refugees under the 
definition “refugee”) [https://perma.cc/VC8R-3X8Q], with Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 
1091–94 (9th Cir. 2013) [https://perma.cc/BSG8-PU9A], Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 137–38 (2d 
Cir. 2012) [https://perma.cc/ZUP9-7AEQ], and Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding witnesses who have helped law enforcement to constitute a protected group) 
[https://perma.cc/526U-GBTM]. 
74 See James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Causal Connection (“Nexus”) to a Convention 
Ground, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 463 (2003) (arguing that courts do not explain their nexus 
findings) [https://perma.cc/HYQ5-DBMH]. 
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lead to the most cogent approach. This Essay examines four nexus 
(causation) models including the sole cause, but-for, 
circumstantial/contributing cause, and bifurcated models. The “family 
focus” approach this Essay endorses combines the but-for and 
circumstantial/contributing cause models—either or both models may be 
used to establish nexus in family-based asylum cases. Neither of these 
models requires the applicant to establish the sole subjective intent of the 
persecutor or two asylum grounds. 
A. Sole Cause Nexus Model 
The sole cause model is the “most restrictive method of interpreting 
the nexus clause.”75 It “require[s] that the protected ground constitute the 
sole cause or reason for the well-founded fear of being persecuted.”76 
According to Michelle Foster, many courts proceed on the assumption that 
there can only be one reason for persecution, and that the existence of the 
non-Convention motivation therefore cancels the Convention ground.77 
This assumption is problematic because it does not take into account “the 
complexity of the factual situations and the interlinked matrix of factors 
that often lead to a person’s need for . . . protection.78 
The approach of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in mixed-motive, 
family-based asylum claims most closely resembles the sole cause nexus 
model. The decisions reflect the assumption that there can only be one 
relevant motivation for persecution, and that asylum may not be granted 
where that reason is personal vendetta or retaliation.79 There is no 
discussion in the decisions as to the possibility of mixed motives or 
evolving motives. 
The sole cause model should not be accepted in family-based asylum 
cases for several reasons. First, as Foster notes, the sole cause approach is 
shallow and superficial and does not accurately capture the complex factual 
situations often present in asylum cases. Next, it would effectively preclude 
almost all family-based asylum claims as families are regularly targeted 
because of the actions of a member. It would be inconsistent to accept the 
family as a major protected ground for asylum, yet at the same time 
preclude almost any claim under that ground. Furthermore, the sole cause 
nexus approach directly contradicts the 2005 REAL ID Act, which 
recognizes multiple motive cases as valid.80 
Finally, the sole cause model would exclude mixed-motive political 
opinion cases, which are widely accepted when political opinion is at least 
one central reason for past persecution or feared future persecution. Well-
founded fear of persecution has been found in cases where additional 
 
75 Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 269 (2002). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 269–70. 
78 Id. at 273. 
79 See supra Section III.A. 
80 See New Nexus, supra note 23, at 389. 
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motives include recruitment and extortion, which are not protected.81 
Additional motives do not preclude protection and are not required to stem 
from a Convention ground in mixed-motive political opinion cases and thus 
should similarly not be required in family-based claims. 
B. “But-for” Nexus Model 
In a recent article, Anjum Gupta argues for the “but-for” nexus rule 
based on her examination of tort and anti-discrimination law.82 Under the 
rule,  
the relevant question in asylum cases would be whether, but for the 
applicant’s protected status, the persecution would have occurred or would 
occur in the future. If it is more likely than not that the persecution would not 
have occurred or would not occur in the future, nexus is established.83  
In all of the cases described in this Essay, the applicant would not have 
been persecuted or feared future persecution but for the fact that he or she 
was a family member of a government witness, a debtor, or someone who 
resisted gang recruitment, etc. This model would “shift the focus from the 
particular motives of the persecutor to the status of the applicant.”84 
There are many sound reasons to adopt a but-for causation model in 
asylum law. The current lack of a uniform standard or test has “resulted in 
the inconsistent application of the nexus rule,” and a but-for rule would 
lead to uniformity and consistency.85 Furthermore, 
the goal of refugee and asylum law is not to assign blame or to change the 
persecutory behavior; rather, it is to provide protection to those who face 
persecution because of a characteristic they cannot or should not be required 
to change and who are unable to receive such protection from their home 
countries.86  
This view of asylum law is consistent with the but-for model that focuses 
on the status of the applicant. Finally, proving the exact motive of the 
persecutor may be impossible as that person “is not in the courtroom but 
instead is generally hundreds or thousands of miles away.”87 The but-for 
rule is a cogent model to use in the mixed-motive, family-based asylum 
context because “the persecutor might, in fact, be motivated to harm the 
applicant by a desire for revenge against the applicant’s relative; 
 
81 See, e.g., Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 800–06 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding Maoists’ attacks 
against Nepali asylum applicant were on account of political opinion as well as extortion and 
recruitment) [https://perma.cc/7N4M-DPMA]; Sanchez Jimenez v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1235–36 
(11th Cir. 2007) (holding asylum applicant targeted for both his financial resources and his political 
opinions to be protected) [https://perma.cc/HJ68-QV6N]; Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247, 
1249 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting woman from El Salvador whose family’s safety was threatened if they 
did not join a guerilla group) [https://perma.cc/KQY6-HU8K]. 
82 New Nexus, supra note 23, at 428. 
83 Id. at 429. 
84 Id. at 388. 
85 Id. at 429. 
86 Id. at 430. 
87 Id. at 432. 
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nevertheless, the applicant ultimately is being persecuted because of a 
characteristic she is powerless to change: her family membership.”88 
Stephen Legomsky and Cristina Rodriguez also endorse the but-for 
asylum nexus rule, but with some caveats. They explain that under their 
rule, although the but-for rule is sufficient, it is not necessary to establish 
nexus.89 For example, in cases where two independent motives each on 
their own could have led to the persecution, their version of nexus would 
be established if either was a substantial factor and related to a protected 
ground.90 They also qualify their support for the but-for rule in situations 
where the “persecution technically would not have occurred but for a 
Convention ground, but where the link between the Convention ground and 
the persecution is so remote that as a policy matter the nexus requirement 
should be held not to have been met,” drawing on the doctrine of proximate 
cause in tort law.91 For example, if an applicant was attacked on his or her 
way to church (and religion was otherwise unrelated to the attack), one 
could still say the attack would not have not occurred but for his or her 
religion. Still, the nexus in that situation would be too tenuous to accept. 
C. Circumstantial/Contributing Cause Nexus Model 
The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground 
(Michigan Guidelines) organized by James Hathaway state that “[t]he 
requisite causal connection between the risk of being persecuted and a 
Convention ground may be established by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence.”92 According to the analysis in the Michigan Guidelines, 
protection should not be made contingent on “whether persecutors choose 
to announce their motivations,” as that would be “impossible to square with 
either the text or surrogate protection purposes of international refugee 
law.”93 Sufficient evidence of causation, absent the persecutor announcing 
his motives, would include: 
evidence that persons who share the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion are more at risk 
of being persecuted than others in the home country is a sufficient form of 
 
88 Id. at 451. 
89 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 988 (5th ed. 2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 989. Gupta also qualifies support for the but-for nexus rule. New Nexus, supra note 23, at 
442 (“In tort law, even if a defendant was negligent, the plaintiff was harmed, and the but-for test is 
met, the defendant will not be held liable if her negligence was too remotely linked to the harm suffered 
by the plaintiff. Similarly, in refugee law, even if the applicant has a protected status, she is persecuted, 
and the but-for test for causation is technically met, a court could still find that the nexus has not been 
established if it determines that the protected status was too remotely linked to the persecution.”). 
92 James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 210, 217 (2002) [hereinafter Michigan Guidelines] [https://perma.cc/T4EV-FQ96]. 
93 James C. Hathaway, The Causal Nexus in International Refugee Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207, 
208 (2002) (presenting forward to the Michigan Guidelines) [https://perma.cc/46SV-TQNN]. 
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circumstantial evidence that a Convention ground was a contributing factor 
to the risk of being persecuted.94 
The model presented in the Michigan Guidelines also follows the 
accepted “one central reason” analysis of the REAL ID Act, finding, 
[a] Convention ground need not be the sole, or even the dominant cause of 
the risk of being persecuted, but it must be a contributing cause to the risk. 
The same test should be applied whether the risk is experienced individually 
or as part of a group, and whether in war or in peace.95 
Michelle Foster describes this contributing cause model as a “rejection 
of the sole test approach.”96 The contributing cause model “does not require 
the decisionmaker to ascertain the relative weight of each of several causes, 
but rather requires only a finding that a Convention ground is a 
contributing cause.”97 Even if courts reject the sole cause model, there is 
still a question of “whether there is a minimum threshold that must exist 
before a protected ground falls within the scope of the test.”98 The Fourth 
Circuit has found that a protected ground need not be “the central reason or 
even a dominant central reason,” but it must be more than an “incidental, 
tangential, superficial, or subordinate . . . reason for harm.”99 
The circumstantial/contributing cause model is also compelling and 
may be preferred to the but-for rule in that it has a less “speculative and 
hypothetical nature” and may also be more able to “accommodate 
situations involving multiple causes.”100 Under a 
circumstantial/contributing cause nexus model, many of the family-based 
asylum claims discussed in this Essay would be recognized, although they 
may be more difficult to establish than under the but-for model. Applicants 
could have to show, for example, that persecutors tend to target family 
members (i.e., MS-13 gang members often kill the family members of 
persons who testify against them in court), or present evidence that other 
members in their family have been threatened, killed, or are at greater risk. 
The family focus approach also includes the 
circumstantial/contributing cause model as it is more helpful in certain 
cases where the but-for model is insufficient to establish causation. Like 
the but-for model, it is in line with the intent of the Refugee Convention 
and can accommodate both mixed-motive asylum cases and cases with 
complex factual scenarios. 
D. Bifurcated Nexus Model 
Karen Musalo advocates for a bifurcated asylum nexus rule. Under the 
bifurcated model “the nexus consideration [is not limited] to an analysis of 
 
94 Michigan Guidelines, supra note 92, at 217. 
95 Hathaway, supra note 93, at 209. 
96 Foster, supra note 75, at 283. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 285. 
99 Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) [https://perma.cc/PP3B-
4W7V]. 
100 See New Nexus, supra note 23, at 453–54 (quoting Hathaway & Foster, supra note 74, at 471). 
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the motives of the individual perpetrator of the persecution, but includes 
societal and State factors in the equation.”101 According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), when using the 
bifurcated model, 
The causal link may be satisfied: (1) where there is a real risk of being 
persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor for reasons which are related to 
one of the Convention grounds, whether or not the failure of the State to 
protect the claimant is Convention related; or (2) where the risk of being 
persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a Convention 
ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to offer protection is 
for a Convention reason.102 
The bifurcated nexus model is essential to understanding certain kinds 
of asylum claims, especially gender-based claims. For example, in the 
context of domestic violence, the persecutor may have motives beyond 
hatred or punishment of women, but being a woman is a significant part of 
the reason the state will not protect the applicant from the persecution. 
Although this model is very helpful in understanding gender-based and 
other claims, it would not be as applicable to family-based asylum. Usually 
the reason the state will not protect those who fear family-based 
persecution is not because of their membership in the group, but because 
the state generally is unable to protect its citizens. While this model may 
not contribute as much to the understanding of mixed-motive, family-based 
asylum claims, it also does not take anything away from them or suggest 
they should not be recognized. Mixed-motive, family-based asylum claims 
would be analyzed on the first prong of the UNHCR model. This model 
also strengthens the argument that the applicant should not be required to 
present direct evidence that the persecutor was motivated by hatred of or a 
desire to punish the applicant for a protected characteristic to establish 
nexus. 
VI. A “FAMILY FOCUS” APPROACH 
This Essay endorses a “family focus” approach to mixed-motive, 
family-based asylum claims. Under this approach, persecution on the basis 
of family ties may satisfy the nexus requirement in two distinct ways. First, 
under a but-for analysis, courts could look to whether the persecution 
would have occurred if not for the family connection. Or, relying on a 
contributing cause model, courts could look to whether circumstantial 
evidence establishes that the applicant is at greater risk because of 
membership in a family group. Either way, nexus would be established. 
Importantly, advocates need not attach additional descriptors beyond the 
family group to family-based particular social group formulations. When 
 
101 Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying 
Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 779 (2003). 
102 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a 
Particular Social Group” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) 
[https://perma.cc/KWG4-JLQ7]. 
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the family stands alone as the group, the nexus can be more clearly 
established. 
Furthermore, a family focus approach also avoids clashing with 
negative precedent in family-based asylum claims with a gang recruitment 
or witness/informant component. For example, in In re S-E-G- the BIA 
found that neither “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to 
recruitment efforts by MS-13 . . . who have rejected or resisted membership 
in the gang” nor “family members of such Salvadoran youth” constituted 
particular social groups.103 While the BIA rejected these groups for lacking 
particularity and social visibility, it did not “address the question whether 
‘family’ alone [would be] a social group under the circumstances of [the] 
case.”104 
In Orellana-Monson v. Holder the Fifth Circuit rejected all the 
particular social groups suggested by parties in the case: “Salvador[an] 
males between the ages of 8 and 15 who have been recruited by Mara 18 
but have refused to join the gang because of their principal opposition to 
the gang and what they want,” “young Salvadoran males who are siblings 
of a member of the aforementioned social group,” and “family member[s] 
of Jose Orellana-Monson.”105 
The final group the Fifth Circuit considered—“family member[s] of 
Jose Orellana-Monson”—is an example of the family focus approach.106 
Jose feared persecution for resisting gang recruitment, and his brother, 
Andres, feared persecution because of his family relationship to Jose.107 
Although the Fifth Circuit rejected Andres’s group, they did not consider it 
properly. The court rejected the group finding: 
membership in a particular family is derivative of Jose’s claim which we 
have already determined to lack particularity. It stands to reason that if Jose’s 
claim is too amorphous since it encompasses a wide swath of society 
crossing many political orientations, lifestyles, and identifying factors, then a 
group consisting of all family members of that already large segment, is even 
less particularized and therefore does not meet the particularity 
requirement.108 
The Fifth Circuit erred in that it did not analyze the group “family 
member[s] of Jose Orellana-Monson.”109 Instead, it analyzed the group as if 
it also included “Salvador[an] males between the ages of 8 and 15 who 
have been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to join the gang.”110 The 
Fifth Circuit’s analysis in this case therefore strengthens the argument that 
a family focus approach could meet particular social group requirements if 
 
103 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008). 
104 Id. at 585 n.2. 
105 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) [https://perma.cc/5MWB-7PH5]; see 
also Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the particular social group “a 
family that experienced gang violence”) [https://perma.cc/5Z3K-8CQD]. 
106 Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 521 (alteration in original). 
107 Id. at 516. 
108 Id. at 522. 
109 Id. at 521 (alteration in original). 
110 Id. at 521 (alteration in original). 
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properly considered because “family member[s] of Jose Orellana-Monson” 
would not include a large, amorphous group of people even if family 
members of “Salvador[an] males between the ages of 8 and 15 who have 
been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to join the gang” would.111 
A possible objection to not modifying the family group further is that 
it may run into “social distinction” challenges. For example, if the proposed 
particular social group is “family members of John Doe” or “members of 
the Doe family,” society as a whole may not view that group as such (if the 
family is not famous or well-known throughout society).112 There is still 
disagreement, however, as to whether social distinction can be established 
in the mind of the persecutor, and advocates should push for a standard that 
looks to either the perception of the persecutor or society as a whole.113 
Furthermore, societal recognition is not greatly enhanced by including 
information describing the original reason a family member was targeted. 
This is because societal recognition typically stems from understandings of 
the family unit itself rather than the actions or predicament of a family 
member. 
VII. IN RE ALBA: EXPANDING FAMILY-BASED ASYLUM 
PROTECTION? 
The BIA is currently considering an important mixed-motive, family-
based asylum case, In re Alba.114 The asylum applicant in the case argued 
he was targeted for persecution by the Mexican cartel, La Familia, based on 
his family group after his father, a former police officer, refused to assist 
the cartel in selling drugs.115 Other family members including his cousin 
and nephew were also targeted by the cartel.116 
In early 2016, the BIA requested that the parties to the case (and 
amici) address whether an asylum applicant who “has demonstrated 
persecution because of his or her membership in a particular social group 
comprised of the applicant’s family” has to show that “the defining family 
member also was targeted on account of another protected ground.”117 
In April 2016, the DHS filed a supplemental brief on the question 
presented by the BIA. The DHS brief suggests that the Department may be 
more open to mixed-motive, family-based asylum in the future. At the 
 
111 Id. at 521 (alteration in original). 
112 See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 236 (B.I.A. 2014) (requiring a level of “social 
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same time, the brief limits the Department’s endorsement of mixed-motive, 
family-based asylum to nuclear family members and does not provide a 
model for analyzing nexus. 
According to the DHS brief, “in many, if not most societies, an 
‘immediate family’ unit, comprised of a ‘person’s parents, brothers and 
sisters, husband or wife, and children,’ will qualify as a cognizable 
particular social group.”118 Furthermore: 
if an applicant for asylum . . . has demonstrated that his or her membership in 
a cognizable family-based particular social group, such as an immediate 
family, is at least one central reason for the persecution suffered or feared, 
then the applicant has satisfied the nexus requirement. The applicant need 
not additionally demonstrate that the “defining family member” was targeted 
on account of a protected ground. Nexus analysis is fact-specific, and 
requires a searching review of the evidentiary record to determine if 
immediate family membership plays a central role for the persecutor’s 
motivation, rather than an incidental, minor, or tangential role.119 
For those presenting mixed-motive, family-based asylum claims with 
a link to a nuclear family member, the Department agrees that the group 
would meet the particularity and social distinction tests for particular social 
group.120 The Department’s position does not prohibit other non-nuclear 
family claims, however: “[w]hether other family relationships are socially 
distinct would depend upon the degree and nature of the relationship 
asserted to define the group and the cultural context for how that type of 
relationship is viewed by the society in question.”121 
In terms of nexus analysis, the DHS brief argues that “[i]f it is a 
central reason for persecuting the applicant . . . the persecutor’s motivation 
for targeting the ‘defining family member’ [the person first targeted for a 
nonfamily-based reason] is not controlling and need not be on account of a 
protected ground.”122 DHS argues that there is no need to analyze other 
underlying motivations for persecution, as long as one central reason is a 
family relationship.123 At the same time, however, the Department does not 
claim that the Fifth Circuit decision in Ramirez-Mejia124 was necessarily 
incorrect because “evidence about the circumstances of other family 
members and whether they have been targeted on account of their family 
relationship” may lead to the conclusion that the persecution was not based 
on the family relationship.125 
In arguing that the circumstances of other family members are 
relevant to the nexus analysis, the Department is endorsing a 
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circumstantial/contributing cause approach; however, it does not explicitly 
state this. At the same time, the brief argues that “[e]vidence that the 
persecutor is or was inclined to persecute other individuals [in the family 
group] . . . should not be required to sustain a claim.”126 The DHS brief 
does not take a clear position on nexus. 
Furthermore, establishing nexus through a circumstantial approach 
will be more difficult if the social group were limited to the nuclear family, 
as the DHS suggests it should be. Because people may have very few 
nuclear family members, requiring proof that one or several nuclear family 
members were also targeted will be difficult. In terms of a nuclear family-
limited particular social group, then, a but-for approach would be 
preferable to a circumstantial approach. If, however, the family group is 
larger, a circumstantial approach would be helpful to establish nexus. 
Either way, the Department, courts, and the BIA should explicitly identify 
the nexus model they are in favor of and why. 
CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split over mixed-motive, family-based asylum 
cases has caused uneven application of U.S. asylum law. The conflict, 
however, may ultimately lead to precedent that expands protection for 
family-based persecution. Close examination of the nexus requirement 
shows that the narrow approach adopted in some circuits is inconsistent 
with the purpose and intent of the Refugee Convention. In the future, 
adjudicators and courts should more clearly explain the nexus models they 
are utilizing and why. Courts should accept the “family focus” approach 
put forth in this Essay and carefully consider the asylum claims of persons 
persecuted on the basis of their family group. Under this approach, a but-
for or circumstantial/contributing cause test would establish nexus. 
Furthermore, the particular social group would be formulated based on the 
family group alone, which would separate the claim from non-asylum 
ground motivations of the persecutor. The family focus approach is 
preferable to the approach taken by several circuit courts because it is in 
line with the intention of the Refugee Convention and widely accepted 
United States asylum law, and can successfully accommodate mixed-
motive and complex cases. 
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